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TED RUSSELL and MANILA RUSSELL, his wife,
Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

FILl!,
SEF- 10 1951 RICHARDS AND BIRD and
----------------------Clerk, Supreme

Cour~.

DAN S. BUSHNELL,

U

Attorneys for Appellants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ERRATA
Page 4, line 18, citation should be 255 Pac. 1039
Page 10, 4th line from bottom, citation should be
269 Pac. ·
.; •
Page 2, following POINT I should be inserted:
Since the pleadings and evid-ence of bo
parties establish an express contrapt, i'
was error to submit the case to the 'jury
the theory of quantum meruito
Page 6, following POINT II should be inserted:
It was error for the court to vacate i
judgment of involuntary dismissal made
following the close of the plaintiff's c
Page 7, following POINT III should be inserted:
The court erred in permitting the jury)
to award damages for the periodrprior to
February 23, 1946, under Section 104-2-~
Uo CoAo 1943 o
Page 9, following POINT IV should be inserted:
The court erred in refusing to grant a
new trial on the evidence of insanity an~
presumed insanity.
TABLE OF CONTENTS should read as new page herewi tn
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WILLARD Y. MORRIS, Executor
of the Estate of William Shields,
Respondent,
Case No. 7630

vs.
TED RUSSELL and MANILA RUSSELL, his wife,
Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Pages 1-17 inclusive of the brief of respondent
endeavor to excite sympathy for the deceased plaintiff
and show how much work he performed for the compensation appellants agreed to pay.
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Appellants have not assigned as error insufficiency
of the evidence to establish the express contract pleaded
by the deceased, nor insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict if the issue be reasonable value of the
services rendered. The lengthy statement of facts of
respondent is, we submit, devoted to immaterial issues,
or else to an effort to mislead the Court as to what the
issues on appeal are.
Appellants reply briefly to the four points covered
by the brief of respondent.

POINT I.
Page:;; 20 and 21 of respondent's brief discuss
joinder of actions in express contract and in quantum
meruit. No issue of this was made by appellants except
to take the position that all of the pleadings in this case
show that each side contends for an express contract and
since the express contract is thereby admitted the
quantum meruit falls by the wayside and the only issue
is: What was the contract? A pre-trial should have
limited the issues to the express contract but in the
absence of that it might have been proper for the
plaintiff to produce evidence to see whether the Court
found evidence of the express contract. At the close
of the plaintiff's case, when evidence of an express contract had been offered, the defendants properly moved
to dismiss, since the defendants pleaded the express
contract and denied plaintiff's allegations as to the
terms.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the top of Page 22, respondent quotes this sound
statement from Bancroft:
''Under certain authorities, it is the rule
that a party declaring upon an express contract
cannot recover on an ilnplied contract or on a
quantum meruit."
This rule is supported by citations of cases from
California, Colorado, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Jersey, South Dakota, Wisconsin Wyoming and Oklahoma. The rest of the quotation shown
in respondent's brief is:
''In other states, however, it is the settled
law that where the complaint alleges a special
contract only and the proof fails to establish
it, but does in fact show the rendition of services, a recovery may be had upon quantum
meruit."
This portion of the quotation is not in point because the proof in our case supports a special contract,
leaving open only the question as to what the precise
terms were.
At the bottom of the same Page 22, respondent
quotes from Bancroft on code pleading Section 705.
With cases from four states in support of the rule,
it is not plain why Bancroft refers to it as a general
rule; and in any event, this quotation from Bancroft
does not deal with the problem here involved. It is
true that a plaintiff may plead alternative counts of
express contract and quantum meruit; and if the answer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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denies both counts there is a proper case to be decided
and the recovery may be on either count. Bancroft
does not say that where an answer to a complaint in
alternative counts admits the e·xpress contract but
denies the measure of recovery that there can then be
a trial on the question of quantum meruit.
In Bancroft's Supplement to Section 705 the following is stated :
"Where two causes of action are stated, one
on an express contract and the other for reasonable value, the defendant admits the contract but
contradicts its terms, it has been held not error
for the Court to determine the issue on principles of quantum meruit."
This is a backwards statement but puts our case
exactly and states it adversely to us. However, the case
upon which Bancroft relies is Holmes vs. Radford, 143
Washington 644, 266 Pac. 1039, and the case does not
support the text. In that case an architect sued for the
value of his services under an express contract and
alternatively for the reasonable value of his services.
The answer admitted the employment and the express
contract and denied the terms· as pleaded by the architect. So far the case is like ours. But the proof showed
uncertainty as to whether an express contract was made
and the position of the defendant was that there was
no express agreement as to the compensation until
after performance had started and that the parties then
agreed on what the compensation would be. The Court
held that the defendant was proving a modified contract
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which was not pleaded and further found that there
was no meeting of the minds at the time of the original
discussions, and, therefore, no contract. The parties did
not meet on the issue of what the contract was, since
the defendant in effect adrnitted no express contract
to begin with and tried to prove a later agreement after
the services had com1nenced, which he failed to establish.
In our case the evidence of both parties is that an
express agreement was made at the time the parties
moved to the tourist court. There is no contention that
there was no meeting of the minds, but only a dispute
in testimony as to the term of compensation upon which
their n1inds met. The applicable rule is correctly stated
by Williston and the Restatement of Contracts cited
at Page 17 of our brief.
In any event, if Bancroft in Section 705 means what
respondent contends for the quotation on Page 22, appellants simply take issue with it and advance the authorities in our original brief as stating the law on this
question.
Respondent advances a new thought on Page 19.
If it be assumed that there was an express contract
between the parties to do the work of a handyman for
board and room and incidental money, then respondent
could still recover the value of work done in excess or
beyond the· terms or requirements of the express contract. If such were the facts and they be established
by pleadings, evidence and instructions to the jury, we
agree that such position is sound. The trouble with it
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is that neither the pleadings, nor the evidence, nor the
instructions permit a verdict on any such theory.
POINT II.
Respondent makes an assertion at Page 9, repeated
at Pages 24 and 25 of its brief, that after the motion
to dismiss the quantum meruit count was granted,
counsel went into chambers, presented authorities, and
the Court took the matter under advisement. The record
is silent on any such action, and this Court must assume
that the record reflects the case as it was tried. Assuming that the facts were as contended by respondent, the
legal effect would be no different. After the motion to
dismiss had been granted, according to the authorities
cited by us, the Court had no further jurisdiction of the
dismissed cause of action, except to order a new trial
in furtherance of justice. If the Court took its own
ruling under advisement to determine whether it was
erroneous, the proper effect of the Court's reconsideration was to consider whether a new trial should at a
subsequent time be granted.
Respondent argues that the appellant offered evidence germane to the issue of quantum meruit. Actually,
appellants offered evidence of the work deceased did,
but none as to its value. This evidence was also germane
to the issue of what the expressed contract between the
parties was, as the nature of the work done by the
deceased would tend to support the respective contentions of the parties. It does not follow that this evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would have been submitted in this manner or at all had
the issue of quantum meruit remained in the case.
Respondent cites Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure at Page 27 with which rule we are perfectly
content. As we read this rule, it says that the Court
could have granted a new trial if its ruling on quantum
meruit was erroneous, but need not have granted it. If
no new trial was granted then the quantum meruit count
stayed out of the case and was improperly the subject
of instructions to the jury. This is the law established
in Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 39 Utah 580, and Tintic
Standard llrfining Company v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491.

POINT III.
Respondent argues first that if the statute of limitations is applicable, the statute was tolled because this
was an open account for services rendered, and then
argues that it was a contract for continuous employment
upon which no cause of action accrued until the services
were terminated.
At Page 31 respondent's brief states:
"* * • that cash and clothing were paid to
plaintiff, which we submit were payments on
account which tolled the statute of limitations, if
such were applicable."

Respondent cites no supporting cases except an
excerpt from the annotation at 36 A.L.R. 346 at Page

350.
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It seems obvious to appellants that there was no
open account between the deceased and the appellants.
The requirements of the Utah case cited at Page 22 of
our brief (Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145) cannot be
met by respondent. There was no account kept by appellants, no showing that any clothing or money paid to
deceased was on an account, and no showing that any
balance was ever computed by either party, let alone
called to the attention of the appellants. The lone
reference to any record was the deceased's statement
that he made entries in a book (108). Deceased's statement that the book had been lost was stricken and there
is no evidence of what the book contained nor any
statement that the appellants knew about it.
Respondent quotes from 36 A.L.R. at Page 350
the statement which deals with an account for services
where a balance has been shown and entries made by
the debtor in the account. It would be more appropriate
to quote from Pages 355-357 of the same annotation
where the cases say that the debtor must have knowledge
of charges in the account before any paYJ?ent can have
validity to toll the statute of limitations as the theory
is based, after all, on an implied promise to pay the
balance·.
The items of clothing and the money paid by appellants to the deceased are entirely consistent with their
agreement that deceased should have board and room,
clothing and money for incidentals (149, 183, 227).
As to whether the contract was a continuous one
calling for payment at the end of the term, or contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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calling for monthly payment, respondent cites no authorities except 58 Amer. Juris 556 at Pages 35 and 36
of his brief and for the rest discusses the cases in appellant's original brief. 'rhe American Jurisprudence citation stopped short. The next language is :
""~here, however, the hiring of services is
without agreement as to tern1 or an1ount of compensation, and there is no evidence of payments,
the law, it see1ns, will not i1nply an agreement
that pa)1nent of cmnpensation shall be postponed
until the tern1ination of the employment."

There was no testimony of an agreement postponing
date of payment of compensation to the deceased. The
conversation testified to by deceased was for $100.00 a
month. Under the authorities cited by us there can be
no question that if such be the agreement the causes of
action accrued monthly and the failure of deceased to do
anything about it resulted in barring of his action for
the period prior to February 23, 1946.
At Pages 36-38 respondent belabours our mistaken
statement that the contract there was to run until the
death of the mother. The mistake is immaterial. In
our case the contract was for a certain rate per month
and therefore payable monthly and not for continuous
services as in the Gulbrandson case.
POINT IV.
On Page 39, respondent argues that the evidence
of insanity was not newly discovered and that the Judge
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
could have so found. That is a matter for the Court to
determine in its discretion and the Court did not dismiss or strike the motion for new trial but denied it,
and presumably accepted at face value the allegations
that the evidence was newly discovered (R. 31).
Respondent then argues that appellants must have
known Shields was insane because they lived together
for several years. The sanity of the deceased cannot be
determined on this appeal and the purpose of this point
on the appeal is to have the question of insanity adjudicated in a proper manner.
Respondent at Pages 40-42 urges that the defense
of incapacity to sue has been waived. The statutes which
control Tooele Meat and Storage Company v. Elite
Candy Company, 57 Utah 1, are superseded by the Rules
'of Civil Procedure. Rule 17 (b) establishes the incapacity of an insane person to bring the suit; Rule 12
(h) establishes the waiver, and Rule 60 (b) provides
relief from mistakes from inadvertence or upon newly
discovered evidence. The evidence which has been newly
discovered shows that there was no waiver of the defense
because the defense was not known to be available, thereby overcoming the phrase in Rule 12 (h) "a party
waives all defenses." The Tooele ~{eat case was a collateral attack upon the judgment. The correct approach
is found in J. B. Colt Company v. District Court, 72
Utah 281, 267 P. 1017, where relief was denied only
because more than six months had passed since judgment.
We take issue with respondent's statement that the
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Oregon guardianship was terminated. Neither absence
from the hospital by escape nor discharge of a guardian
is an adjudication of sanity.
Respondent attetnpts to brush aside problems arising from an insane person's incapacity to contract and
to testify as argued in our brief. The fact that an insane
person is entitled to recovery for the reasonable value
of his services, when a suit is brought by his guardian,
is no answer. If the Court had instructed on that theory
after determining the insanity of the deceased that
might be an answer; but the instructions of the Court,
the pleadings, and the evidence are consistent with
accepting the testimony of the deceased and recognizing
his power to contract, which elements can be eliminated
from consideration only through granting the motion for
new trial.
CONCLUSION
Appellants have presented four points supported
by authorities, each of which constitutes an adequate
basis for reversal of the District Court and granting
the motion for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS

AND

BIRD and

DAN S. BUSHNELL,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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